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Technological advancements vastly improve efficiency and
productivity in the workplace. However, technology also brings with it
the ability to transmit mass amounts of business information with ease.
As technology continues to evolve and become increasingly prevalent in
the modern workplace, the insider presents a considerable threat to
employers. In fact, employers increasingly face disgruntled employees
who are all too eager to download their employers' sensitive,
confidential, and proprietary information before terminating the
employment relationship. However, the digital age, a global economy,
and a highly mobile workforce have rendered the law utterly unreliable
in addressing employee misappropriation. In enacting the Defend Trade
Secrets Act ("DTSA") in 2016, Congress ought to provide clear rules and
predictability for everyone involved. Yet, the DTSA has already proven
inadequate in creating any reliable expectations for employers or
employees. This Note thus advocates for comprehensive statutory reform
to address the unreliable legal framework. Specifically, this Note
proposes that Congress amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to
limit its application in the employment context, and amend the DTSA to
provide the Federal Trade Commission with the authority to regulate
trade secret misappropriation.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which a trusted and loyal employee has
access to a computer database containing confidential and proprietary
information belonging to the employer. The employee's access to this
information is vital to the efficient and successful operation of the
employer's business. After some time, the employee becomes unhappy
with his employer and resigns. Subsequently, the employer logs on to
the employee's computer and discovers that the departing employee
recently emailed a mass amount of the employer's confidential and
proprietary information to his personal email account. The employer
immediately panics, given that it must expend significant resources to
determine exactly what information the employee has obtained,
whether there was a data breach that must be reported to a proper
authority, and what the employee might do with the information.
Unfortunately, this scenario is increasingly prevalent in the
modern workplace and can be a potential nightmare for employers. It
has become commonplace for employers to use electronic databases to
store proprietary information, such as customer lists, financial data,
and corporate strategies.' There is no question that technological
advancements enabling the storage and transmission of mass amounts
of information effectuate efficiency and productivity in the modern
workplace; however, such advances also place a greater burden on
employers seeking to protect proprietary and confidential information
stored on computer databases.2 In the ordinary course of business, it is
1. See, e.g., Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Disloyal
Employees: How Far Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret Theft?, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1447, 1448 (2013) (noting that employers now store business documents on
electronic servers rather than in physical file cabinets).
2. See, e.g., Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today's
Threats?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 8-9 (2014) (statement of Peter L. Hoffman, Vice President, Intellectual Property
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often necessary for employers to allow certain employees to access
proprietary information.3
Employers have long turned to trade secret law for a potential
remedy against employees who misappropriate this proprietary
information.4 However, trade secret protection has become more
difficult due to technological innovations, the pervasive use of smart
devices, the ease with which data can be downloaded and disseminated,
and the increased mobility of employees. In fact, it is often unclear what
proprietary information even qualifies for protection as a trade secret.5
Accordingly, as more business information is stored electronically,
employers often turn to state computer fraud laws and the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")-the application of which
remains uncertain and inconsistent among jurisdictions.6 Thus, the
legal framework within which employers can protect their valuable
business information is presently unclear, leaving employers and
employees without guidance as to their legal rights and obligations
regarding the use and protection of proprietary information.
To address this vast uncertainty, this Note advocates for
comprehensive statutory reform of the current legal framework to
provide both predictability and reliability in the regulation of the use
and protection of business information. Part I introduces the competing
policy considerations underlying the protection of business information
and the current threats facing employers. Part II explores the laws
Management, The Boeing Company) ("[T]oday companies cannot simply lock their trade secrets in
a safe. The vast majority of our business and engineering information is stored electronically. The
digital age has brought great gains in productivity but also has increased risk."); S. REP. No. 114-
220, pt. 1, at 2 (2016) ("Protecting trade secrets has become increasingly difficult given ever-
evolving technological advancements."); Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into Federal Court:
Employee "Authorization" Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
543, 545 (2011) ("Computers confer substantial benefits to employers by measurably increasing
worker efficiency and allowing for greater connectivity between enterprises and individuals.");
Pamela Taylor, Comment, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 204-05 (2012) ("One of a business's largest
risks is the threat of the malicious insider.").
3. Of course, an employee's use of an employer's computer system and information generally
is limited to some degree and may be governed by a computer or acceptable use policy. See Dial &
Moye, supra note 1, at 1448 ("Many employers require their employees to follow 'computer use'
policies. . . ."); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1645 (2003) ("[A]n owner may attempt to
regulate computer privileges ... by contract. The owner can condition use of the computer on a
user's agreement o comply with certain rules.").
4. See generally Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 429 (discussing trade secret
law).
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See infra Section II.C.
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governing employment relationships, with a focus on the inadequate
remedies currently available to employers. Part III proposes a reform
that codifies reliable expectations for both employers and employees
and simplifies enforcement. Specifically, it argues that Congress should
amend the CFAA to limit its application in the employment context. It
further contends that Congress should amend the recently enacted
Defend Trade Secrets Act ("DTSA") to grant the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") authority to implement and administer the civil
provisions of the DTSA. Under this framework, the crux of trade secret
protection would be pursued through a civil regime, with the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") retaining authority to prosecute
violations of the criminal prohibition of theft of trade secrets. In short,
this Note exposes the unworkability of the current legal framework as
it operates in the digital age and proposes statutory reform to effectuate
a much-needed change in the regulation of employee misappropriation
of business information.
I. IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY
Business information accounts for much of an employer's most
valuable assets. This information includes business strategies, pricing
and financial data, customer lists, data compilations, and reports. To
accord the ideal amount of protection for business information, the law
must strike a balance between the competing interests of employers,
employees, and society. The digital age complicates this balance,
rendering the current legal framework in dire need of change. Section
A first discusses the competing policy interests underlying the
protection of business information. Section B then explores the
complications facing the modern workplace arising from technological
advancements.
A. Competing Policy Interests
Employers have a legitimate interest in protecting their
business information from unauthorized use or disclosure.' Protecting
confidential business information is essential to a company's ability to
develop products, provide services, and gain economic advantages.
Employers spend significant amounts of time and money developing
their business information because it contributes to their ability to
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 8.07(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (stating that
employers have a legitimate interest in protecting "trade secrets ... and other protectable
confidential information that does not meet the definition of trade secret").
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maintain their competitive position and financial success. Business
information can be extremely valuable not only to the employer but also
to both rivals and employees (who can use it to compete)-leaving the
information vulnerable to misappropriation. Misuse or disclosure of
this information can significantly impair, or even destroy, the value of
the information.
Employers have a strong interest in efficient business
operations, and adequate protection of proprietary information is vital
to maintaining such efficiency.8 Employers must be able to
communicate business information with employees who act and make
decisions on behalf of their employers. Yet, employers would be hesitant
to fully communicate with their employees if business information is
not adequately protected from misappropriation.9 Thus, too little
protection of business information frustrates the communication
necessary for efficient business operations.
On the other hand, employees have a strong interest in
employment mobility, which can be compromised if the law affords
business information too much protection. Providing too much
protection of business information inhibits an employee's ability to
move between jobs and to use the knowledge and skills gained during
former employment. Imagine a lawyer who cannot tap into her wealth
of knowledge (about the local court rules, substantive law, etc.) learned
at one firm when she laterals to another. Employment mobility allows
employees to pursue better opportunities, obtain increased wages, and
escape toxic employers.10 In fact, in the absence of special
circumstances, the default rule in all U.S. jurisdictions is employment
at will-which allows either the employer or employee to terminate the
8. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (discussing the policy
rationales behind trade secret law); Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965) ("Unless protection is given against unauthorized disclosure of confidential
business information by employees, employee-employer relationships will be demoralized;
employers will be compelled to limit communication among employees with a consequent loss in
efficiency; and business, espionage, deceit, and fraud among employers will be encouraged."); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 68, 69 (1989) ("Trade secret law performs two vital functions: encouraging individual
effort and investment in research and development and helping maintain 'standards of commercial
ethics.' ").
9. See Winston Research Corp., 350 F.2d at 138 (articulating that employers will be hesitant
to communicate with employees if unauthorized disclosure of business information is not
restricted).
10. See Matthew C. Palmer, Note, Where Have You Gone, Law and Economics Judges?
Economic Analysis Advice to Courts Considering the Enforceability of Covenants Not o Compete
Signed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1124-25 (2005)
(analyzing economics behind at-will employment doctrine).
2018] 1037
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employment relationship at any time and for any reason." Unless the
employer and employee agree otherwise, the at-will default rule enables
employees to move freely between jobs. 12 This freedom to move between
employers allows employees to continue growing their knowledge,
skills, and experience.
Additionally, society as a whole has a strong interest in how
much protection the law affords business information. The public
desires innovative products and vigorous competition in the workplace.
"The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition."1 3 Competition produces lower prices and better
goods and services.14 Because of the importance of competition in our
society, competitive behavior has long been regulated at the federal
level. 15
In sum, too much protection for employers diminishes healthy
competition and reduces market efficiency.16 Overprotecting business
information can deter potential competitors from entering the market. 17
Constraining competition impedes the dissemination of ideas and
processes and inhibits the market from channeling labor to its greatest
productivity. 18 Yet, too little protection discourages innovation-which
is essential to generating change, enhancing quality, and reducing
prices. Employers can gain a competitive advantage through valuable
developments and improvements; however, employers cannot afford to
subsidize the costs of the necessary research and development without
assurance that valuable developments will not be misappropriated19 -
11. See, e.g., Hanson v. Cent. Show Printing Co., 130 N.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Iowa 1964) (noting
that absent a stipulation as to the duration of an employment relationship, employment contracts
are no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable by either party); RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T
LAW § 2.01 ("Default Rule of an At-Will Employment Relationship").
12. See 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8:4, at 521 (5th ed. 2014) ("[A]n at-
will employee is as free to sever the employment relationship as the employer, and has no
obligation to the former employer other than fiduciary obligations not to reveal trade secrets or
otherwise to engage in tortious interference with business." (footnote omitted)).
13. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
14. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y ofProf7 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (discussing legislative intent behind
the Sherman Act, which governs competition law).
15. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal."); id. § 45(a)(1)-(2)
(declaring unfair methods of competition unlawful and empowering the FTC to prevent unfair
methods of competition).
16. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 627
(1960) (discussing the ffect of postemployment restraints).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (noting that encouraging
invention is one of the major policy objectives of trade secret law); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco
Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969) ("If a trade secret is protected, the competitive
1038 [Vol. 71:3:1033
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slowing the development of innovations that could raise quality of life
for everyone.20 Determining the amount of protection the law should
provide business information is thus a delicate balance of competing
societal interests.
B. Technology: Demoralizing the Employment Relationship
Technological advancements impact nearly every aspect of our
lives, and the pervasive influence of technology is especially felt in the
workplace.21 Although technology can increase efficiency and
productivity in the workplace, it also enables easier access to an
employer's valuable business information. As such valuable assets
become more easily copied and distributed, employment mobility
exacerbates the risk to employers of employee misappropriation of
business information.
Employers increasingly encounter employees who abuse
computer privileges to steal massive amounts of business information. 22
advantage realized by the owner of the secret will enable him to recoup his development costs,
hopefully before his competitors can 'reverse-engineer' the product and duplicate it."); Progressive
Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969, 976 (Kan. 2011):
[Tihe law of trade secrets recognizes that private parties invest extensive sums of
money in certain information that loses its value when published to the world at
large.... In doing so, the law allows the trade secret owner to reap the fruits of its labor
and protects the owner's moral entitlement to these fruits. . . . Without trade secret
protection, organized scientific and technological research could become fragmented,
and society as a whole could suffer.;
Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960) ("Without some means of post-employment
protection to assure valuable developments or improvements are exclusively those of the employer,
the businessman could not afford to subsidize research or improve current methods."); see also
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
POLICY: S. 1890 - DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT (2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=117358 [https://perma.cc/9KKA-8SJL] [hereinafter STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY] ("Effective protection of trade secrets promotes innovation that is the
engine of the Nation's economy. . . ."); cf. Remarks by the President at Signing of S. 1890 - Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00309 (May 11, 2016):
As many of you know, one of the biggest advantages that we've got in this global
economy is that we innovate, we come up with new services, new goods, new products,
new technologies. Unfortunately, all too often, some of our competitors, instead of
competing with us fairly, are trying to steal these trade secrets from American
companies. And that means a loss of American jobs, a loss of American markets, a loss
of American leadership.
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 3 (2016).
21. See Dial & Moye, supra note 1, at 1448.
22. See Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 IS: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 405, 407-09
(2012) (discussing the increased prevalence of internal data theft); Warren Thomas, Note, Lenity
on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and Solving
the Split over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2011) ("According
to one recent survey, almost 60% of employees who leave their jobs take company data with them.
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By way of illustration, consider the representative case of WEC
Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller.23 In Miller, the defendant
worked as a project manager for a company that provided welding
services to the power generation industry.24 During his employment
with the company, the defendant had access to the company's intranet
and computer servers, enabling him to access numerous confidential
and trade secret documents, including pricing terms, pending projects,
and the company's technical capabilities.25 Upon terminating his
employment with the company, the defendant went to work for a
competitor.26 Prior to his resignation, however, the defendant
downloaded a substantial number of the company's confidential
documents and emailed them to his personal email account.27 The
defendant's previous company sued the employee and its competitor-
alleging nine state law causes of action and a violation of the CFAA-
after the defendant used this information in a presentation to win a
project from a potential customer.28 The court concluded, however, that
the employer did not state a claim under the CFAA and dismissed the
remaining claims for lack of jurisdiction.29
As Miller illustrates, the current threat to employers is
significant because much of their business information is integral to
their competitive advantage in today's economy. 30 Yet, such information
is highly susceptible to theft given increased digitization of critical data
and the ease with which employees can take this information by simply
emailing it to a personal email account or downloading it to a flash
drive.31 Indeed, according to a 2016 study analyzing the state of
cybersecurity and digital trust, sixty-nine percent of companies have
experienced data theft by corporate insiders over the last twelve
months.32 Some estimate that damage to companies from data theft
Indeed, technological advances have made it easier than ever for employees to walk out the door
with confidential information: 'The digital world is no friend to trade secrets.'" (footnote omitted)
(quoting Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital
Environment, 49 IDEA 359, 361 (2009))).
23. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
24. Id. at 201-02.




29. Id. at 207 ("[W]e hold that WEC failed to state a claim for which the CFAA can grant
relief .... Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means to rein in rogue
employees."); see also infra Section II.C.
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 3 (2016) (explaining the need for DTSA).
31. Id.
32. ACCENTURE & HFS RESEARCH, LTD., THE STATE OF CYBERSECURITY AND DIGITAL TRUST
2016: IDENTIFYING CYBERSECURITY GAPS TO RETHINK STATE OF THE ART 9 (2016),
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could rise to ninety trillion dollars per year by 2030 if current trends
continue.33 Thus, the threat of employee misappropriation is extremely
costly to employers.
II. NAVIGATING THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
An employer's right to protect its business information arises out
of contractual agreements with employees, the duty of loyalty, statutory
protection against misappropriation of trade secrets, and arguably
federal and state computer fraud laws.34 However, the laws governing
competitive behavior of employees offer little certainty for employers
and employees alike. To demonstrate this uncertainty, this Part
addresses the current legal framework, ultimately showing that it
provides inadequate protection to business information. First, Section
A discusses two sources of state law governing employment
relationships and introduces employers' legal remedies against
employees who misappropriate business information. Section B then
explores and analyzes the laws governing misappropriation of trade
secrets. Finally, Section C introduces the CFAA and analyzes its
applicability in the employment context.
A. Laws Governing the Employment Relationship
Contract and agency laws are two of the primary sources of law
governing the employment relationship.35 As such, employers may
attempt to protect their information by relying on the enforcement of
contractual postemployment restraints on competition and breach of
fiduciary duty claims.36 However, even in combination, these laws
https://www.accenture.com/t20160704T14005_w_/us-en/_acnmediaPDF-23/Accenture-State-
Cybersecurity-and-Digital-Trust-2016-Report-June.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.ccl7AGJ-S7JW];
see also Matthew Kalman, Two-Thirds of Companies See Insider Data Theft, Accenture Says,
BLOOMBERG: TECH. (June 26, 2016, 7:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-
26/two-thirds-of-companies-see-insider-data-theft-accenture-says [https://perma.cc/ENN7-BKPN]
(discussing the Accenture study); Data Theft by Employees Affects 69% of Businesses: Accenture
Survey, INS. J. (June 27, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2016/
06/27/418402.htm [https://perma.cc/3MCE-D2DD] (same).
33. Kalman, supra note 32.
34. See infra Section II.C.
35. See, e.g., Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1051 (5th
Cir. 1998) ("[A]n employment-at-will relationship is a contractual one, even though either party
can terminate it without cause at any time."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2006) ("An employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the
manner and means of the agent's performance of work."); 1 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, § 1:29, at
153 ("[T]he employer-employee relationship is a contractual relationship.").
36. See, e.g., Tradesman Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013) (listing counts
alleged in employer lawsuit against former employees who opened a competing business).
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(which have been used for decades to protect employers) are inadequate
in today's technology driven world.
1. A Contractual Relationship
Despite the default rule of employment at will, most
employment relationships are contractual.37 Accordingly, an employer
can attempt to protect its confidential business information by relying
on contractual rights and remedies. For example, employers may
include general confidentiality clauses in their employment contracts,
which define the information the employer intends to protect and the
employee's obligations to keep the information confidential.38
Consequently, the employer has a potential claim under state law
against any employee who breaches this contract by disclosing
confidential information.
To extend protection of business information beyond the
duration of the employment relationship, employers may enter into
additional contractual agreements with their employees as a means of
constraining postemployment competition.39 Such agreements include
nonsolicitation clauses, nondisclosure agreements, and covenants not
to compete.40 The least restrictive of these agreements is a
nonsolicitation agreement, which is simply a commitment not o solicit
the employer's clients or customers.41 A nondisclosure agreement-
which is slightly more restrictive-is a commitment not to disclose any
37. See, e.g., Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1051 (noting that employment relationships are contractual).
38. See, e.g., Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2002):
[Paragraph] 2. Disclosure of Confidential Information. I shall not at any time during
the term of my employment or thereafter, ... use, publish, disclose or authorize anyone
else to use, publish, or disclose any confidential information belonging to [the
employer]. Confidential information includes, but is not limited to, models, drawings,
memoranda and other materials, documents or records of a proprietary nature,
information relating to research, finance, accounting, sales, personnel management and
operations; and information particularly relating to customer lists, price lists, customer
service requirements, costs of providing service and equipment, pricing, and equipment
maintenance costs.
39. See Blake, supra note 16, at 625-26 (noting that employees may enter into covenants not
to compete with their employers).
40. See, e.g., Outsource Int'1, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The
Employment Agreement contained confidentiality and non-compete clauses as conditions of [the
employee's] employment."). If an employee breaches one of these agreements, the employer may
pursue a breach of contract claim seeking injunctive relief or damages. See, e.g., id. at 666; Reliable
Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 395 (111. 2011).
41. See, e.g., Sevier Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d 995,
997-1001 (Ala. 1998) (discussing nonsolicitation agreements), overruled by White Sands Grp.,
L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009) (overruling Sevier and other cases to the extent hey
required proof of absence of justification as part of the prima facie case for wrongful interference
with the business relationship).
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confidential information learned during employment.42 The most
restrictive agreement-a noncompete-is a commitment not o engage
in or start a similar profession or trade as that of the employer for a
specified period of time following employment. 43
The enforceability of these contractual agreements is uncertain
at best.44 Postemployment constraints on competition are considered to
be in restraint of trade, and thus contrary to long-established public
policy. 4 5 The policy against restraining trade is grounded in the
resulting injury to the party restricted from competing and injury to the
public through the deprivation of the restricted party's industry.46
Moreover, many courts find that these agreements contravene public
policy because they involve parties of unequal bargaining power and
most employees are not given a real choice in accepting such
agreements.47 Since these contractual provisions are in tension with the
default rule of employment at will and are contrary to public policy,
they are subject to significant judicial scrutiny.48 Courts will only
enforce these contracts if they are reasonable in scope and protect the
former employer's legitimate interests.49 Courts have developed many
tests to determine whether such agreements are reasonable.50 They
42. See, e.g., Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Mfg., 885 N.W.2d 861, 866 (Mich. 2016)
(describing a nondisclosure agreement).
43. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 16, at 625-26.
44. See, e.g., Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768-76 (Tex. 2011) (discussing the
enforceability of covenants not to compete); see also Daniel P. O'Gorman, Contract Theory and
Some Realism About Employee Covenant Not to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 147-48 (2012)
(noting that even within a jurisdiction it is difficult to predict how a trial court will respond to a
noncompetition agreement).
45. See, e.g., Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 66 (1873) ("It is a
well-settled rule of law that an agreement in general restraint of trade is illegal and void. . .
46. Id. at 68:
There are two principal grounds on which the doctrine is founded, that a contract in
restraint of trade is void as against public policy. One is, the injury to the public being
deprived of the restricted party's industry; the other is, the injury to the party himself
by being precluded from pursuing this occupation and thus being prevented from
supporting himself and his family.
47. See, e.g., Malic v. Coloplast Corp., 629 S.E.2d 95, 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that most
restrictive covenants in employment contracts are reviewed under strict scrutiny because they
involve parties of unequal bargaining power, are drafted by the employer, and generally give the
employee a take it or leave it choice); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and
Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 (discussing the lack of employee bargaining power when signing
noncompetes).
48. See generally Palmer, supra note 10, at 1126-30 (discussing the enforcement of restrictive
covenants in employment-at-will relationships).
49. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 16, at 649; Palmer, supra note 10, at 1127.
50. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Johnston, 245 P.2d 239, 250 (Or. 1952):
Three things are essential to the validity of a contract in restraint of trade: (1) it must
be partial or restricted in its operation in respect either to time or place; (2) it must be
2018] 1043
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generally will only enforce the noncompete if the restriction is limited
in geographic scope and duration, is not harmful to the general public,
and is not unreasonably burdensome on the employee.51 And, because
of wide variations in approaches to noncompetition agreements, a
court's choice of law will often be decisive.52
Because of the questionable enforceability of these agreements,
employers cannot rely on contractual provisions to protect against
employee theft of company data. Even if a court does find the existence
of an agreement necessary to protect employers' legitimate interests-
such as the maintenance of proprietary or confidential business
information-the agreement must still be reasonable in other aspects
to be enforceable. If an agreement is too broad in scope or is against
public interest, courts might find it unreasonable notwithstanding the
legitimate protectable interest.53 Furthermore, states such as
California refuse to recognize such agreements at all, deeming these
restraints on trade unenforceable altogether as against public policy.54
The viability of these agreements as a means to protect employers from
employee theft of company data is therefore uncertain at best, and as
such, are an inadequate means for employers to protect themselves
from disgruntled employees.
2. An Agency Relationship
Regardless of whether an employee is at will or subject to a
contract, principles of agency law also govern employment
relationships, as employees are agents of their employers during the
on some good consideration; and (3) it must be reasonable, that is, it should afford only
a fair protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it is made, and must not be
so large in its operation as to interfere with the interests of the public.;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("(1) A promise to
refrain from competition ... is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than
is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed by
the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.").
51. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999).
52. Tradesman Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1017 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring). In some cases, this results in a race to the courthouse. See, e.g., Advanced Bionics
Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2002).
53. See, e.g., MacGill v. Reid, 850 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that although
the employer had a legitimate protectable interest, the covenant was unreasonable in its scope and
thus unenforceable).
54. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017) ("[E]very contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2018) ("Every contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.").
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term of employment. 5 Pursuant to agency law, agents have a fiduciary
duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected
with the relationship.5 6 As such, employees generally "owe an undivided
and unselfish loyalty to [their employer] during the term of their
employment, such that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest."57
Many states recognize a cause of action for a breach of this duty
of loyalty.5 8 Employers may pursue breach of loyalty claims for
predeparture activities, which typically involve an employee soliciting
customers to open a competitive business, aiding a competitor and
planning to join that competitor after termination of the employment
relationship, or usurping a corporate opportunity.5 9
Agency law is also inadequate in protecting employers because
of the significant limitations of fiduciary duty claims. An employer only
has a claim for a breach of the duty of loyalty if the employee goes
beyond mere planning and preparation and actually engages in direct
competition with the employer during the term of the employment
relationship.60 The first limitation is that employees must engage in
direct competition with the employer, which requires something more
than agreeing, planning, or preparing to compete.61 Thus, inchoate
breaches of the duty of loyalty cannot serve as the basis of a colorable
claim. These claims are further limited by the fact that the duty only
lasts for the duration of the employment relationship. Thus, any use of
misappropriated information following termination of the employment
relationship would not constitute a breach of the employee's duty of
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) ("[A]n employee
is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's
performance of work . . . ."); see also id. § 1.01 ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises
when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall
act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent
or otherwise consents so to act.").
56. Id. § 8.01.
57. Hedgeye Risk Mgmt., LLC v. Heldman, 196 F. Supp. 3d 40, 52 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Mabus, 894 F. Supp. 2d 71, 92 (D.D.C. 2012)).
58. See, e.g., Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Mo. 2005) (en
banc) ("In the employer-employee relationship, this Court, drawing on the Restatement (2d) of
Agency, has implicitly recognized a separate cause of action for b[rleach of the duty of
loyalty. . . .").
59. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 8.01(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
60. See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 491-93 (Colo. 1989) (en banc);
Scanwell, 162 S.W.3d at 477. For more information on the employee's duty of loyalty, see Catherine
Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of
Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 413 (2012).
61. Scanwell, 162 S.W.3d at 479-80.
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loyalty, so the employer would not have a valid fiduciary duty claim
against the employee.62
B. Trade Secret Protection
Given the deficiencies demonstrated above under state contract
and agency law, a more practical remedy for employers to protect
proprietary information is through trade secret law, which does not
require a contract specifically prohibiting the employee's use and
disclosure of protected information.63 Rather, trade secret law derives
from notions of fair play and business ethics.64
Although trade secret law developed under the common law,
most states today offer statutory protection of trade secrets.65 Forty-
eight states have enacted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA"), 66 which codifies the common law principles of trade secret
law. Under the UTSA, to qualify for trade secret protection, information
must derive value from its secrecy and the employer must make
reasonable efforts to maintain the information's secrecy.67 An employer
has a legal remedy when its trade secret is misappropriated, which the
UTSA defines as:
[D]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a
person who . . . at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
62. See Hedgeye, 196 F. Supp. 3d at 53.
63. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 583-84 (2001) (noting that
disclosure of trade secrets can be restrained in the absence of a specific covenant).
64. RINSDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS, at iii (1953) ("In the absence of contract, the basis for
[trade secret] protection is fair play and business ethics.").
65. Prior to states adopting the UTSA, most states recognized misappropriation of trade
secrets as a common law tort claim. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332
N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (discussing the common law principles of trade secret law and
stating that the UTSA clarifies many of the rules of the common law). A majority of the courts
addressing the issue of whether the UTSA preempts state common law tort claims for
misappropriation have held that it does. See, e.g., Firetrace USA, LLC v. Jesclard, 800 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1047-50 (D. Ariz. 2010).
66. See DAVID W. QUINTO ET AL., TRADE SECRETS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (2017 ed.) (citing
the trade secret statute of each state); see also Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969,
976 (Kan. 2011) (stating that the UTSA seeks uniformity with other jurisdictions).
67. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985):
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
For a detailed description of the meaning of each element and how courts define what constitutes
a trade secret under the UTSA, see QUINTO ET AL., supra note 66, § 1.03.
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knowledge of the trade secret was ... acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use .... 68
Though the classic example of a trade secret is the recipe for
Coca-Cola,69 employers today often seek trade secret protection for more
general confidential business information, such as customer lists or
business strategies.70 Employers have even attempted to claim trade
secret protection for employees' personal social media contacts.71 With
this expansion of information employers seek to protect, courts,
employers, and employees face challenges in identifying what
information constitutes a trade secret-a highly fact-intensive
inquiry. 72
Even if the information at issue involves a protectable subject
matter, it can be particularly difficult to prove that the employer
maintained adequate secrecy if numerous employees have access to the
information on a computer database.73 Developments in computer
forensics have increased the ability of employers to track the
downloading, copying, and emailing of files, which eases the burden on
employers to demonstrate that an employee expropriated documents or
files. 74 However, this can be an extremely costly endeavor for employers
and such expenditures might not be worth the cost, especially when an
employer is uncertain whether the allegedly misappropriated
information qualifies for trade secret protection.
68. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii).
69. See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS
LIMITATIONS 508 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining that the recipe for Coca-Cola is the paradigmatic trade
secret, but it is more challenging today to identify what constitutes a trade secret); see also Spitz
v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC, 969 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2013) ("Information that is
generally known within an industry, even if not in the public at large, as well as information that
can be readily duplicated without considerable time, effort, or expense, is not a trade secret.").
70. GLYNN ET AL., supra note 69, at 508; Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade
Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 441, 503-04 (2001) (describing the shift in what types of business assets employers
claim as trade secrets).
71. See, e.g., Cellular Accessories for Less, Inc. v. Trinitas LLC, No. CV 12-06736 DDP (SHx),
2014 WL 4627090, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (finding that an issue of fact remains as to
whether LinkedIn contacts are a protectable trade secret).
72. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Alpha Packaging, Inc., 379 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010)
("The question of what constitutes a trade secret is fact-intensive." (citing Vigoro Indus., Inc. v.
Crisp, 82 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 1996))).
73. See, e.g., Natalie Flechsig, Note, Trade Secret Enforcement After TianRui- Fighting
Misappropriation Through the ITC, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 451 (2013) (noting that "[t]he
danger of losing the secrecy status of a trade secret has increased with the advent of the Internet
and a global workforce that has become highly mobile due to the increased collaboration between
U.S. and foreign companies").
74. See, e.g., Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2010)
(discussing revelations from testing by a computer forensics expert following departure of a high-
level employee, including access patterns and use of external storage devices).
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Thus, although once considered a reliable and adequate remedy
for employers, the digitization of business assets and globalization of
companies have rendered state trade secret law an uncertain and
inconsistent legal regime. Although trade secret law has long been a
matter of state law, Congress enacted the DTSA in 2016, creating a
private federal cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets.75
The DTSA amended the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), which had
previously made theft of trade secrets a federal crime but left civil
remedies to state law.76 In enacting the DTSA, Congress sought to
address the concerns arising from a globalized economy and the
movement of data across state lines.77 Congress recognized that the
variance in trade secret law among the states rendered it ineffective in
a national and global economy, and suggested that federal courts are
better situated to address trade secret misappropriation than state
courts.78 Thus, Congress enacted the DTSA in an attempt to provide
"clear rules and predictability for everyone involved."79
The DTSA is in part modeled off of the UTSA.s0 The DTSA
defines a trade secret as information that the owner has taken
reasonable measures to keep secret and that derives independent
economic value from not being generally known nor readily
ascertainable through proper means.8 1 Under the DTSA, the owner of a
75. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1832, 1833, 1836, 1839 (Supp. 2016)).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (proscribing theft of trade secrets); H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 1, 4
(2016) (stating that the DTSA amends the EEA to provide a federal civil remedy for the
misappropriation of trade secrets).
77. H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 4 ("The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (S. 1890) offers a
needed update to Federal law to provide a Federal civil remedy for trade secret
misappropriation.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 6; see also STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, supra note 19:
The Administration strongly supports passage of [the DTSA], and appreciates the
bipartisan effort that led to formulation of this bill . . . . [The DTSA] would establish a
Federal civil private cause of action for trade secret theft that would provide businesses
with a more uniform, reliable, and predictable way to protect their valuable trade
secrets anywhere in the country.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5 (noting that the DTSA's definition of misappropriation is
modeled off of the UTSA).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3):
[A]11 forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret;
and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
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trade secret has a private civil right of action for misappropriation if the
trade secret is related to a product or service used in interstate or
foreign commerce.82 Mirroring the definition of the term under the
UTSA, misappropriation under the DTSA includes acquisition by
improper means and disclosure or use without consent.83
The DTSA, however, fails to promote uniformity and thus still
lacks expectations upon which employers and employees can rely. Not
only do employers now allege claims under both the DTSA and the
applicable state's version of the UTSA, but decisions interpreting the
DTSA also illustrate that federal courts look to state trade secret law
from the state in which the court sits to analyze DTSA claims.84 The
DTSA has failed to produce case law independent of state trade secret
laws such that trade secret law remains unpredictable among the
states. Therefore, the uncertain and inconsistent legal framework will
likely persist despite Congress's effort to establish uniformity and
reliability.
C. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Because so much of an employer's valuable business information
is stored electronically, many employers have turned to computer fraud
laws, including the CFAA and similar state statutes, to pursue claims
against employees who misappropriate proprietary information using a
computer.85 Although originally enacted as a narrow antihacking
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of
the information ....
82. Id. § 1836(b)(1).
83. See id. § 1839(5).
84. See, e.g., Segerdahl Corp. v. Ferruzza, No. 17-CV-3015, 2018 WL 828062, at *2-3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 10, 2018) (analyzing employer's claims under the DTSA and the Illinois Trade Secret Act
("ITSA") together); Openwave Messaging, Inc. v. Open-Xchange, Inc., No. 16-CV-00253, 2018 WL
692022, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2018) (analyzing employer's claims under the DTSA and
California Uniform Trade Secret Act as one claim); Sterling Computs. Corp. v. Haskell, 4:17-CV-
04073-KES, 2018 WL 671210, at *2-5 (D.S.D. Feb. 1, 2018) (analyzing employer's claims under
the DTSA and UTSA together); Elsevier Inc. v. Doctor Evidence, LLC, 17-CV-5540, 2018 WL
557906, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2018) (analyzing employer's claims under federal and New York
trade secret law together); Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 789, 796-97
(W.D. Wis. 2017) (stating that "the court's analysis will use Wisconsin's UTSA, but the analysis
would apply as well to the DTSA"); Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
3d 915, 919-22 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (laying out federal and state trade secret law individually and then
analyzing the two trade secret counts as one claim).
85. This Note discusses the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, but most states have a
statute with similar language under which employers may sue an employee. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 569.095(1)(3) (2017) ("A person commits the offense of tampering with computer data if he
or she knowingly and without authorization or without reasonable grounds to believe that he has
such authorization .. . takes data . .. residing or existing internal or external to a computer,
computer system, or computer network. . . .").
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statute in 1984,86 the rising presence of computers in the workplace,
amendments expanding the scope of the act,87 and the addition of a
private civil right of action have led employers to increasingly rely on
the CFAA to enforce computer use policies in the workplace.8 8
The CFAA in its current form defines several computer crimes.89
Because Congress continually expands the scope of the CFAA, 90 the
statute has played an increasingly important role in protecting
employers from competition by former employees.9 1 Prior to the
enactment of the DTSA, employers often brought CFAA claims in
conjunction with state trade secret claims as a way to bring the lawsuit
in federal court.92 Arguably, the DTSA alleviates the need for this
strategy because it establishes federal question jurisdiction and allows
employers to bring these suits in federal court.93 However, because a
CFAA claim does not require a noncompetition agreement or a finding
that the information obtained constitutes a trade secret, employers
86. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)) (defining three specific
computer hacking crimes); see also Dial & Moye, supra note 1, at 1451 ("Originally, the CFAA was
intended to be an anti-hacking statute."); David J. Schmidt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should Not Apply to Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423,
429 (2014) ("The legislative history demonstrates the CFAA was enacted as an anti-hacking
statute.").
87. For a detailed analysis of the amendments to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see
Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561,
1563--71 (2010).
88. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 208 ("The CFAA provides employers with a civil remedy in
federal court, and it is increasingly used against former employees."); see also Booms, supra note
2, at 548-50 (discussing the increasingly broad scope of the CFAA and the benefits for employers
resulting from civil actions against disloyal employees under the CFAA).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). The CFAA criminalizes using a computer to obtain national
security information, accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access
and thereby obtaining information, trespassing in a government computer, accessing a computer
to defraud and obtain value, intentionally damaging a computer by knowing transmission,
recklessly damaging a computer through intentional access, negligently causing damage and loss
by intentional access, trafficking in passwords, and extorting by threatening to cause damage to a
computer. Id.; see also COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 2 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4PZ-2SVE] [hereinafter PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES] (summarizing CFAA penalties).
90. Kerr, supra note 87, at 1563-71 (discussing amendments to the CFAA).
91. See Kapitanyan, supra note 22, at 408-09 (discussing the prevalence of internal data
theft); Booms, supra note 2, at 550 (discussing CFAA claims against disloyal employees); Taylor,
supra note 2, at 208 ("The CFAA provides employers with a civil remedy in federal court, and it is
increasingly used against former employees. Disgruntled employees who are about to resign often
retain full access to computer systems and have the ability to copy data prior to their departure.").
92. See, e.g., Booms, supra note 2, at 550 (noting that asserting a CFAA claim offers
employers a doorway into federal court).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
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have continued (and likely will continue) bringing claims against
employees under the CFAA even with the enactment of the DTSA.94
The broadest provision of the CFAA (and the most relevant in
the employment context) provides that "[w]hoever . .. intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access, and thereby obtains ... information from any protected
computer ... shall be punished."95 Although the CFAA was enacted as
a criminal statute, it provides for a private civil cause of action if a
CFAA violation results in one of five specified harms.96 The most
relevant in the employment context is "loss to 1 or more persons during
any 1-year period ... aggregating at least $5,000 in value."97 Under the
CFAA, loss includes the costs of investigation, forensic analysis, and
other remedial measures incurred because of a violation of the CFAA. 98
The CFAA contains a similarly broad definition of the term
"computer,"99 which "captures any device that makes use of a[n]
electronic data processor."100 A "protected computer" is any computer
94. See, e.g., Segerdahl Corp. v. Ferruzza, No. 17-CV-3015, 2018 WL 828062, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 10, 2018) (listing claims alleged by employer, including claims under DTSA, ITSA, and
CFAA); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandhu, No. 17-3031, 2018 WL 617991, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30,
2018) (stating that employer brought claims under CFAA, DTSA, and Pennsylvania Uniform
Trade Secrets Act); Frank N. Magid Assocs., Inc. v. Marrs, No. 16-CV-198-LRR, 2017 WL 3097257,
at *1 (N.D. Iowa July 20, 2017) (discussing employer's claims against employee, including claims
under both DTSA and CFAA); Chubb Ina Holdings Inc. v. Chang, No. 16-2354-BRM-DEA, 2017
WL 499682, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017) (finding that employer stated claims under both CFAA
and DTSA).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012).
96. See id. § 1030(g) (limiting the civil right of action to conduct involving one of the factors
set forth in § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V)); id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V) (listing the following factors:
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . .. aggregating at least $5,000 in
value; (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of
the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (III)
physical injury to any person; (IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage
affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security).
97. See id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
98. See id. § 1030(e)(11) (defining loss as "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service"); Lasco
Foods, Inc. v. Hall & Shaw Sales, Mktg., & Consulting, LLC, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052 (E.D. Mo.
2009) (holding that "the cost of the forensic analysis and other remedial measures associated with
retrieving and analyzing Defendants' computers constitute 'loss' under [the] CFAA").
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1):
"[C]omputer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high
speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or
operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated
typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device ....
100. United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011).
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"used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication."101 It would be difficult to imagine a computer in the
modern workplace that does not fit within this definition, as any
computer connected to the internet affects interstate commerce and is
therefore a protected computer. 102 Several courts have determined that
an internet connection is sufficient to render a computer a protected
computer under the CFAA. 103 For instance, in United States v. Trotter,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained that "[t]he
Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce,"
"[a]s both the means to engage in commerce and the method by which
transactions occur."104 As such, "[w]ith a connection to the Internet," a
computer is "part of a system that is inexorably intertwined with
interstate commerce," and therefore falls within the definition of a
protected computer under the CFAA. 105
For an employer to state a valid claim against a current or
former employee under the broadest provision of the CFAA, then, an
employer must allege that (1) the employee intentionally accessed a
computer, (2) without authorization or exceeding authorized access, (3)
thereby obtaining information, (4) from a protected computer, and (5)
causing a loss suffered by one or more persons during any one-year
period aggregating at least five thousand dollars.106 Notably, the only
element requiring an intentional act by the employee is the act of
accessing the computer.
This private right of action enables employers to bring a claim
against current or former employees who obtain information from a
protected computer without authorization, or-as is more likely in the
case of an employee-by exceeding authorized access and causing loss
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
102. See PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 89, at 4 ("[I]t is enough that the
computer is connected to the Internet; the statute does not require proof that the defendant also
used the Internet to access the computer or used the computer to access the Internet."); Kerr, supra
note 87, at 1570 ("[E]very computer around the world that can be regulated under the Commerce
Clause is a 'protected computer' covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1030."); see also Shawn E. Tuma, 'Wat
Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?"-A Primer on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for
Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 157 (2011) ("This ... classification . . . essentially makes a
protected computer out of every computer connected to the Internet and, quite possibly, every
computer.").
103. See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007).
104. 478 F.3d at 921 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. MacEwan,
445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)).
105. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)-(c)(2)(B)(iii); LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132
(9th Cir. 2009) (listing required elements for bringing an action under § 1030(g) based on a
violation of § 1030(a)(2)).
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to the employer.107 With employers increasingly using a statute
originally designed to prosecute external computer hackers against
disloyal employees, courts are left to wrestle with the breadth of the
CFAA and have struggled to interpret and apply it in the employment
context.108 Although the CFAA is a potentially powerful weapon for
employers when employees misappropriate electronic information, its
inconsistent application among circuits compromises its
effectiveness. 109
Interpretation of this statute, like any other, begins by looking
to the text. 110 The CFAA does not define what it means for an individual
to access a computer "without authorization," but does define the term
"exceeds authorized access" as "access[ing] a computer with
authorization and [using] such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that [the individual] is not entitled so to obtain or
alter."111 Thus, the term "exceeds authorized access" is generally
understood to apply to the inside hacker ("who [is] authorized to access
a computer"), as distinguished from the outside hacker ("who break[s]
into a computer").1 12 In the former case, the insider has allegedly
exceeded his limited access by obtaining or altering information.113
Each of these phrases has generated interpretive issues. First,
courts are split on whether an employee can access a computer "without
authorization" by breaching his duty of loyalty, or if an employee
accesses a computer "without authorization" only after the employer
expressly revokes the employee's authorization.1 14 Further, courts
107. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 208-09 (discussing the CFAA civil cause of action in the
employment context).
108. Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing P.C. Yonkers,
Inc. v. Celebrations The Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005)); see
also Thomas, supra note 22, at 380 ("'[C]ourts have struggled over how to interpret the provisions
of the CFAA' in the context of employer litigation over employees' misappropriation of data."
(quoting ES & H, Inc. v. Allied Safety Consultants, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-323, 2009 WL 2996340, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2009))).
109. See, e.g., Dial & Moye, supra note 1, at 1449 ("[I]t has become unclear whether and to
what extent he CFAA remains a viable method of enforcing the theft of electronic information by
internal employees.").
110. Cf. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011)
("Because the statute does not define 'report,' we look first to the word's ordinary meaning." (citing
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S.
179, 187 (1995))).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
112. United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing S. REP. No. 104-357,
at 11 (1996)); see also United States v. Nosal (Nosal 1), 676 F.3d 854, 858, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
113. PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 89, at 8.
114. Compare Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an employee's authorization to access a computer ended when the employee violated his duty
of loyalty to his employer and accordingly the employee's actions were without authorization under
the CFAA), with LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009):
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:1033
diverge on whether an employee "exceeds authorized access" in
violation of the CFAA by accessing information he was authorized to
obtain, but subsequently using the information for an improper or
forbidden purpose. 115
Among courts, there are generally two schools of thought: One is
a broad interpretation that defines authorization by considering the
intended use of the computer, a breach of the employee's duty of
loyalty,116 and computer use restrictions.1 1 7 The other is a narrow
interpretation that focuses on the employer's actions in restricting the
employee's access (e.g., revoking access or limiting access by requiring
codes or passwords).118 Both of these interpretations are inappropriate
as applied in the employment context.
Courts interpreting the CFAA broadly find violations of the
statute when an employee misuses information obtained from the
employer's computer, even if the employee was given access to the
information obtained.119 As such, an employee may access a computer
"without authorization" or "exceed[ ] authorized access" in violation of
the CFAA when he uses information obtained contrary to the
employer's interest1 20 or in violation of the employer's computer use
policy. 121
Although a broad interpretation of the CFAA more adequately
protects valuable business assets from employee misappropriation,
[A] person uses a computer "without authorization" under [the CFAA] when the person
has not received permission to use the computer for any purpose (such as when a hacker
accesses someone's computer without any permission), or when the employer has
rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer
anyway.
115. Compare WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2012)
(adopting a narrow reading of the phrase "exceeds authorized access" and holding that it "appl[ies]
only when an individual . .. obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that which he is
authorized to access"), and Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 863 (holding that "'exceeds authorized access' in
the CFAA does not extend to violations of use restrictions"), with United States v. Rodriguez, 628
F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that an employee exceeded authorized access "when he
obtained personal information for a nonbusiness reason"), and United States v. John, 597 F.3d
263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding "that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which access
has been given are exceeded").
116. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21; Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.,
119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (concluding that employees lose their authorization
to access their employer's computer when they send proprietary information to a competitor).
117. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263-64; John, 597 F.3d at 271; EF Cultural Travel BV v.
Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581-82 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that an employee may exceed
authorized access by breaching a confidentiality agreement).
118. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524-25 (2d Cir. 2015); Miller, 687 F.3d at 206;
Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 860.
119. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263-64; John, 597 F.3d at 271.
120. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421; Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
121. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263-64; John, 597 F.3d at 272; Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582.
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interpreting the CFAA to include violations of computer use restrictions
is overly broad. 122 In United States v. Nosal (Nosal 1), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the notice problem that would
arise by allowing criminal liability under the CFAA to turn on "private
policies that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read."12 3
The court noted that this interpretation would allow "private parties to
manipulate their computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn
these relationships into ones policed by the criminal law," transforming
whole categories of innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply
because a computer is involved.124 As such, the Ninth Circuit declined
to follow the approach of other circuits applying the CFAA to corporate
computer use restrictions.125
As applied in the employment context, the broad view
inappropriately brings the intent of the employee and use of the
information into the analysis rather than focusing on the employee's
authority to access the information.12 6 This enables employers to
circumvent causes of action specifically intended to address
misappropriation by employees. Furthermore, a violation of the CFAA
subjects an employee to both civil and criminal liability. Thus, a mere
violation of an employment contract becomes a federal tort and a federal
criminal offense. 127 This is especially problematic given that the only
element requiring an intentional act by the employee is the act of
122. See, e.g., Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 860; Kerr, supra note 87, at 1599 ("Because Internet users
routinely ignore the legalese that they encounter in contracts governing the use of websites,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and other computers, broad judicial interpretations of
unauthorized access statutes could potentially make millions of Americans criminally liable for
the way they send e-mails and surf the Web.").
123. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 860.
124. See id. (discussing examples of innocuous conduct that may constitute a violation of
the CFAA). Furthermore, the effects of such a broad interpretation are not limited to the
employment context. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the effect of this broad construction on the
workplace "pales by comparison with its effect on everyone else who uses a computer, smart-
phone, iPad, Kindle, Nook, X-box, Blu-Ray player or any other Internet-enabled evice." Id.
at 860-61. All of the devices that people routinely use online rely on remote access to
computers, which "is governed by a series of private agreements and policies that" that few
people are aware of or understand but that can serve as the basis for CFAA liability. Id.
Further, "website owners retain the right to change the terms [of service] at any time and
without notice." Id. at 862. Thus, this construction of the CFAA would allow rather innocuous
behavior-completely outside of the employment context-to become criminal "without an
act of Congress, and without any notice." Id. at 861-62.
125. Id. at 863.
126. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2013) ("These rulings
wrap the intent of the employees and use of the information into the CFAA despite the fact that
the statute narrowly governs access, not use.").
127. See Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC v. Frady, No. 3:13-cv-1262-J-34JBT, 2015 WL 1470852,
at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2015); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212,
218 (D. Mass. 2013).
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accessing the computer. 128 Thus, a broad interpretation is inappropriate
as applied in the employment relationship.
Courts following the narrow interpretation hold that an
employee-usually an authorized computer user-does not act "without
authorization" until the employer has rescinded that authorization. 129
And an employee only "exceeds authorized access" when he "obtains or
alters information on a computer beyond" what that employee "is
authorized to access," which essentially requires the employee to
circumvent restrictions to gain entry into a system beyond his ordinary
access.1 3 0 Accordingly, courts with this view find that misappropriation
or misuse of information is not a sufficient basis for CFAA liability. 131
Under the narrow interpretation it is more difficult for
employers to protect electronically stored business assets, including
confidential and proprietary information. Arguably, this interpretation
is inadequate in protecting employers because it allows employees who
steal massive amounts of company data to escape CFAA liability simply
because their employer entrusted them with access to valuable
128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009).
130. See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012).
131. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524-27 (2d Cir. 2015); Miller, 687 F.3d at 206;
Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 858, 860 (9th Cir. 2012). The DOJ endorsed this interpretation in the
criminal context in a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys outlining its intake and charging policy for
computer crimes. See Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the U.S. Attorneys & Assistant
Attorney Gens. for the Criminal & Nat'l Sec. Div. (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-ccips/file/904941/download [https://perma.cc/2M63-J3C7]. The DOJ articulated several
factors for federal prosecutors to consider when deciding whether to pursue CFAA cases, including
sensitivity of the information, national and economic interests, furtherance of larger criminal
endeavors, impact on third parties, and deterrence value. Id. at 1-2.
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information in the ordinary course of business. 132 However, employers
have a number of other remedies upon which they can rely. 133
Both interpretations are problematic not only for conduct in the
workplace but also for conduct engaged in by ordinary citizens, like
password sharing.134 The CFAA, a statute not intended for use in the
employment context, fails to balance the competing policy interests
underlying state employment laws and trade secret law. Further, it
remains an unpredictable legal remedy for employers because it is
unclear how a court will interpret the CFAA in the employment
132. Even the narrow construction of the CFAA risks criminalizing a broad category of
common actions outside of the employment context. In United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), the Ninth
Circuit found that a former employee violated the CFAA by accessing the employer's computer
system using the log-in credentials of a current employee. See 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016).
The dissent raised the concern that the majority's interpretation captures "ubiquitous, useful, and
generally harmless" conduct, and "threatens to criminalize all sorts of innocuous [password
sharing] engaged in daily by ordinary citizens"-like sharing Netflix, Hulu, or HBO Go account
information. Id. at 1049, 1053 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Under either a broad or narrow
interpretation of the CFAA, password sharing in the streaming service context may violate the
statute because streaming services such as Netflix specifically prohibit password sharing. See
Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX § 7(a), https://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?locale=en
&docType=termsofuse (last updated Aug. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6SMS-ZH39]:
The member who created the Netflix account and whose Payment Method is charged is
referred to here as the Account Owner. The Account Owner has access and control over
the Netflix account. The Account Owner's control is exercised through use of the
Account Owner's password and therefore to maintain exclusive control, the Account
Owner should not reveal the password to anyone.;
see also B. Alan Orange, Netflix, HBOGo & Facebook Password Sharing Is Now a Federal Crime,
MOVIEWEB (July 9, 2016), http://movieweb.com/netflix-hbo-facebook-password-sharing-fedral-
crime/ [https://perma.cc/BU4G-HY6Q]; Bre Payton, Court: Yes, Sharing Your Nexflix Password Is
Illegal, FEDERALIST (July 11, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/07/11/court-yes-sharing-your-
netflix-password-is-illegall [https://perma.cc/LSP2-U7QD]; Ruling Could Make Sharing
Passwords for Subscription Services a Federal Crime, Fox NEWS (July 11, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/07/1 /ruling-could-make-sharing-passwords-for-
subscription-services-federal-crime.html [https://perma.cc/6ZAP-DMKX]. Although it may seem
absurd, streaming companies, producers, or artists may attempt to deter this conduct at the
expense of the millions of Americans who engage in password sharing. With the pervasive presence
of password sharing, harmed parties may want to ensure they are properly and fairly paid for their
work, products, or services. Further, given the copyright litigation from illegal music downloading
that exploded over a decade ago, and the more recent copyright litigation involving illegal movie
downloads, artists and producers may similarly find that with the prevalence of password sharing
today, they are not being paid fairly for the public's access to their work and may want to take
action to deter this conduct. Although Netflix has not attempted to enforce its prohibition on
password sharing, it is possible that others may take action. For example, if entertainment
streaming companies pay artists or producers related to the number of account holders, such
password sharing may have a more harmful effect than people think, which may even discourage
producers or artists from allowing these companies to stream their works. For an instance of the
illegal downloads litigation, see, for example, Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for
Alleged Illegal Downloads, CNNMONEY (June 10, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/
06/10/technology/bittorrentlawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/GF2T-DF4Y].
133. See supra Sections IIA, II.B.
134. See supra notes 124, 132.
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context.135 A broad view enables employers to circumvent the
requirements of other causes of action merely because the employer's
information is stored on a computer, presenting considerable notice
concerns for employees. Conversely, a narrow view does not adequately
protect most of an employer's business information from employee
misappropriation. In sum, the CFAA is an inappropriate legal remedy
in the employment context.
III. FORTIFYING THE FRONT: RELIABLE EXPECTATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS
AND EMPLOYEES REGARDING THE PROTECTION AND USE OF BUSINESS
INFORMATION
Knowledge and information are valuable assets in the digital
age.136 Employers strive to protect much of their valuable business
information, but given the conflicting policy interests at issue, it is often
unclear whether a court will enforce contractual constraints on
competition, if the employer can establish trade secret status, or how a
court will interpret the CFAA in the employment context. As employers
digitize more of their valuable assets and information, there must be a
reliable legal framework governing the rights and obligations of
employees and employers. The law, at times, becomes ill suited to the
digital age, and must accommodate for advances in technology.137
This Part advocates for comprehensive statutory reform to
adequately address misappropriation of business information in the
digital age. The proposed reform aims to create reliable expectations on
the front end, balance the competing interests at stake, and sufficiently
protect employers in the digital age, while also eliminating concerns
about the overbreadth of the CFAA. This Part first advocates that
Congress amend the CFAA to eliminate the civil cause of action in the
employment context and further define "exceeds authorized access" by
clarifying that it refers to the unauthorized procurement of information
rather than an improper use or misappropriation of information
obtained with permission. This Part further proposes that Congress
amend the DTSA to charge the FTC with implementation and
135. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandhu, No. 17-3031, 2018 WL 617991, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 30, 2018) ("How to apply the definition of 'exceeds authorized access' under section
1030(a)(4) of the CFAA when it is an employee who properly accessed and improperly used the
information has split the circuit courts.").
136. See, e.g., Chris Montville, Note, Reforming the Law of Proprietary Information, 56 DUKE
L.J. 1159, 1159 (2007) ("As the nation continues its shift toward an information economy,
knowledge becomes an ever more significant asset for American employers.").
137. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating
that it may be necessary to reconsider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where the current
approach has become "ill suited to the digital age").
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administration of the DTSA, leaving the criminal offense of theft of
trade secrets under the EEA as it was before enactment of the DTSA.
Although each of these statutory amendments can stand on its own, the
comprehensive reform proposed would best promote predictability in
this area of law and protect both employers and employees.
A. Protecting Employees and Ordinary Computer Users Under the
CFAA
While the CFAA remains a valuable tool to prosecute external
computer hacking, application of the statute in the employment context
has proven problematic at best. 138 Therefore, this Section proposes that
Congress amend the CFAA in two respects. First, Congress should
exclude claims against former or current employees from the provision
authorizing private civil causes of action.139 Second, Congress should
adopt the narrow view of the CFAA by clarifying the CFAA's current
definition of "exceeds authorized access" and limit it even further.
First, Congress should amend the CFAA to limit the availability
of the private cause of action in the employment context. Specifically,
Congress should amend section 1030(g), which authorizes private civil
actions, to exclude from its authorization actions brought by employers
against former or current employees. Thus, Congress should add to the
end of section 1030(g) the limitation that "no action may be brought
under this subsection by an employer against a current or former
employee."
Employers already have numerous alternative causes of action
against current and former employees who obtain information from
their employers' computers. Eliminating the civil cause of action in the
employment context will encourage employers to proceed under causes
of action that account for the competing policy interests behind the
protection of business information. This limitation will prevent
employers from being able to circumvent the requirements of contract,
tort, or trade secret law to sue employees merely because they obtained
any information from any computer. If the information obtained by an
employee does not qualify for protection as a trade secret, the
employer's attempt to prohibit the former employee from using the
information seems akin to an attempt to eliminate ordinary competition
even though use of the information by the employee would not give the
employee the type of unfair advantage that these laws aim to
138. See supra Section II.C.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
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prevent. 140 Moreover, eliminating this remedy will encourage
employers to be more diligent in drafting employment contracts and
policies, thus providing employees with more adequate notice of their
obligations with respect to their employers' business information.
Further, Congress should adopt the narrow view of the CFAA by
clarifying the CFAA's current definition of "exceeds authorized
access."14 1 Generally, computer owners define a user's authorized access
and can regulate the user's privileges by code (e.g., requiring a
password to gain access to certain information) or by contract (e.g., a
Terms of Use agreement).14 2 Under the broad view of the CFAA, which
delineates liability based on contract-based restrictions, computer
owners are able to define the scope of criminality-which may result in
a strikingly broad criminal prohibition without substantial connections
to the rationales behind criminal punishment.143 Employees and other
computer users may be unaware of the implications of violating
computer use restrictions regarding information that they are
authorized to access.
Congress should thus clarify the CFAA's current definition of
''exceeds authorized access" to avoid a broad criminal prohibition of
conduct based on violations of computer use restrictions alone.
Currently, the statute defines this term as "to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."144
Congress should clarify this definition by adding "for any purpose" at
the end of the definition and specifying that "the accesser does not
exceed authorized access by using access to a protected computer for an
improper purpose." Amending the CFAA in this way will promote
consistent applications of the CFAA among courts and limit the
potential of criminal liability for employees. Congress should further
limit the scope of the CFAA by clarifying that "authorization"
encompasses "the permission of either the system owner or a legitimate
account holder."145
Of course, amending the CFAA in these respects does not
adequately protect employers in a world of constantly evolving
140. See Tradesman Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 2013).
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
142. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1644 ("[A] computer user can engage in computer misuse by
circumventing code-based restrictions, or by breaching contract-based restrictions.").
143. See id. at 1651 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of computer misuse statutes to
require circumvention of code-based restrictions and stating that "[b]y granting the computer
owner essentially unlimited authority to define authorization, the contract standard delegates the
scope of criminality to every computer owner").
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
145. Nosal II, 844 F.3d 1024, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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information technology where inside "hackers" are one of the biggest
threats to employers' information.146 However, when entrusting
employees with some of their most valuable assets, employers need
some assurance that employees will not abuse inside access to
misappropriate proprietary information. 147 Without such an assurance,
employers may be hesitant to allow any employee to access proprietary
information, preventing employers from efficiently operating their
businesses.148 To create reliable expectations, both employers and
employees must be aware of acceptable uses under the law and the
potential liability for unacceptable uses.
B. Combating the Insider Threat Through the DTSA and the
Regulatory State
The DTSA is an appropriate vehicle to address theft of business
information by employees who may not have "exceed[ed] authorized
access" to obtain such information under the CFAA, but are nonetheless
culpable because they lacked authorization to take such information.
Unlike the CFAA, the DTSA focuses on what the employee is allowed
to do with information obtained rather than how the employee initially
obtained it. The DTSA does not focus on the unauthorized access of
protected information but rather on the use or disclosure of information
without consent and the acquisition of information through improper
means-which includes "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means."149 Thus, employers should be able
to rely on the DTSA for legal recourse. However, even if employers rely
146. See Kapitanyan, supra note 22, at 408-09 ("The malicious insider is one of the most
significant threats companies face because the malicious insider has relatively easy access to a
company's most valuable assets and knows exactly where to find them.... Mhe great[est] threat
lurks within businesses themselves.").
147. See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir.
1965) (articulating that employers will be hesitant o communicate with employees if unauthorized
disclosure of business information is not restricted).
148. Id. ("Unless protection is given against unauthorized disclosure of confidential business
information by employees, employee-employer elationships will be demoralized; employers will
be compelled to limit communication among employees with a consequent loss in efficiency; and
business, espionage, deceit, and fraud among employers will be encouraged.").
149. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839(5)(A)-(B), 1839(6)(A) (Supp. 2016). This is a more appropriate means
to address misappropriation of proprietary information and violations of computer use policies, as
a breach of an express contract in obtaining a trade secret is conduct that will be deemed improper
for purposes of finding trade secret misappropriation, and in the absence of a contract, courts will
often find an implied duty of confidentiality or implied-in-fact contract. See James W. Hill, Trade
Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 1999,




on the DTSA instead of the CFAA when their information is
misappropriated, there remains a lack of clarity and many caveats with
this approach.150 This Section thus proposes changing the DTSA to
provide power to the FTC to administer the civil regime of trade secret
protection. Specifically, it proposes enabling the FTC to prescribe rules
and general statements of policy, issue administrative orders, and
commence civil actions. 151
Although the DTSA aimed to promote reliability and uniformity
in trade secret law, identifying what information qualifies for trade
secret protection remains uncertain. As federal courts rely on
established state trade secret laws to interpret and apply the DTSA,
federal trade secret law varies among federal courts sitting in different
states.152 This lack of uniformity is problematic given that employers
increasingly operate across state lines. Thus, for employers to
adequately protect their information, they must stay attuned to the
trade secret laws in each state in which they operate. This would likely
be extremely costly and time consuming for employers. Furthermore,
employees who misuse their employer's information risk facing
significant liability even although neither the employer nor the
employee is certain whether the information qualifies for trade secret
protection until after litigation ensues.
Currently the DTSA provides for private civil actions and
enables the Attorney General to obtain injunctive relief in civil actions,
with the EEA providing for criminal penalties-which is similar to the
framework set forth in state trade secret statutes.153 This
multiparadigm legal framework, long enforced in state courts, generally
offered adequate protection for employers prior to the complexity
brought about by the digitization of business information. 154 However,
as discussed above, this area of law is becoming too complex to fit
comfortably within the current legal framework. Given that neither the
DOJ nor federal courts possess a specialized expertise in trade secret
law, they rely on established state trade secret law, which does not
adequately address new types of digital business assets.155 Therefore,
150. For instance-as described above-with employers increasingly storing proprietary
information on computer databases, there are many forms of valuable business assets that may
not constitute a trade secret because the asset does not derive independent economic value from
its secrecy or the employer does not take sufficient efforts to maintain the asset's secrecy because
the asset is contained on a computer database that multiple employees are enabled to access.
151. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 56 (2012) (outlining litigation procedure for the FTC); id. § 57a(a)(1)
(authorizing the FTC to prescribe rules and general statements of policy).
152. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)-(b).
154. See supra Section II.B.
155. See supra Section II.B.
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this Section proposes that the DTSA be administered by a federal
agency to best promote uniformity and reliability in trade secret law.
Federal administrative law aims to empower experts in a given
field to give meaning and content to vague policies set forth by
Congress.156 Accordingly, federal agencies fill in the details of broad
statutes by using their expertise to create prospective, consistent
policies. In this context an agency is better suited than courts to take
into account the competing interests at stake in protecting business
information. Allowing an agency to administer the DTSA would
promote reliability and consistency in the complex area of trade secret
misappropriation.
Specifically, Congress should grant the FTC the authority to
administer the DTSA because the competing policies at stake under the
DTSA are core to the mission of the FTC, which is to "protect consumers
by preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business
practices . . . without unduly burdening legitimate business activity."15 7
The FTC is "dedicated to advancing consumer interests while
encouraging innovation and competition in our dynamic economy."15 8
Accordingly, the FTC is well suited to promote policies under the DTSA
that adequately balance the interests inherent in protecting business
information while effectively promoting competition.
Arguably, the FTC already possesses authority to regulate trade
secret misappropriation under the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTC Act").159 Although primarily focused on consumer welfare, the
FTC Act makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce,"160 and empowers the FTC to "prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations ... from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce . ."161 Under established
common law, trade secret law and misappropriation fall under the
umbrella of unfair competition law and arguably could be regulated
under the FTC Act. 162 However, because the DTSA already provides a
156. See generally Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614,
614 (1927).
157. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Jan.
26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/C88F-JQUK].
158. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last
visited Jan. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5V8K-GP9V].
159. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
161. Id. § 45(a)(2).
162. See, e.g., Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 946, 981 (W.D. Tex. 2011):
The law of unfair competition is the umbrella for all statutory and nonstatutory causes
of action arising out of business conduct which is contrary to honest practice in
industrial or commercial matters. Within the broad scope of unfair competition are the
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statutory scheme with respect to trade secret misappropriation, the
DTSA remains a more practical and specific framework through which
to regulate trade secret misappropriation. Thus, amending the DTSA
to grant the FTC authority to administer the statute and regulate trade
secret misappropriation offers a better solution to protect both
employers and employees.
To effectuate this change, Congress could amend the DTSA by
adding provisions that provide the FTC with the power to enforce the
DTSA, with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as the FTC Act
as if its provisions were incorporated into the DTSA. 1 63 This would
enable the FTC to makes rules and regulations pursuant to the DTSA,
as well as issue orders and file suits in the district courts of the United
States. 164
To adequately protect business information with consistency
and reliability, the DTSA should encompass more specific and definite
language. The FTC can promote uniformity by taking the broad
language of the DTSA and providing guidance to employers and
employees on its meaning and enforcement. The DTSA defines a trade
secret in broad terms,165 which are susceptible to many interpretations
and meanings, resulting in an unclear and unreliable legal framework.
independent causes of action such as trade-secret law . . . and misappropriation, to
name only a few.
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls,
Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. App. 1993)); see also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S.
304, 310-12 (1934):
As proposed by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and as introduced in
the Senate, the bill which ultimately became the Federal Trade Commission Act
declared "unfair competition" to be unlawful. But it was because the meaning which the
common law had given to those words was deemed too narrow that the broader and
more flexible phrase "unfair methods of competition" was substituted. Congress, in
defining the powers of the Commission, thus advisedly adopted a phrase which, as this
Court has said, does not "admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application
of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called 'the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion.'"
(quoting FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).
163. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 70e.
164. Id.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (Supp. 2016):
[A]11 forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret;
and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of
the information . . ..
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Clarifying this complex definition with specificity fits comfortably
within the competence of the FTC.166
In administering the DTSA, the FTC should issue rules or
guidance as necessary to identify specific types of business information
that are protected under the statute-which may vary among
industries. For instance, the FTC can determine whether customer lists
in a certain industry qualify as a trade secret under the DTSA by
considering the nature of the industry, an employee's relationship with
the customers in that industry, and the secrecy and value of a customer
list in the industry. 167 Although this is a complex task and the FTC may
not currently possess the resources or the capability to identify all
cognizable protectable information, this approach is better than leaving
to the courts the entire task of deciding whether information qualifies
for protection after the information is already misappropriated. Once
proprietary business information is disclosed or misappropriated it
166. See, e.g., R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. at 314 ("[The FTC] was created with the
avowed purpose of lodging the administrative functions committed to it in 'a body specially
competent to deal with them by reason of information, experience and careful study of the business
and economic conditions of the industry affected' ..... (quoting S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 9, 11
(1914))).
167. Although some courts have developed a body of case law determining when a customer
list can be protected as a trade secret, the law still varies among states (and thus among federal
courts applying the DTSA), and whether the customer list is protected is determined after it is
misappropriated. The FTC could use variations of the established case law to create proposed rules
or guidance regarding whether a customer list is protected. For an example of a court's
interpretation of trade secret law concerning whether customer lists are protected, see Pyro
Spectaculars North, Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2012), which looked to an
extensive summary of California law:
With respect to the general availability of customer information, courts are reluctant to
protect customer lists to the extent they embody information which is readily
ascertainable through public sources, such as business directories .. . On the other
hand, where the employer has expended time and effort identifying customers with
particular needs or characteristics, courts will prohibit former employees from using
this information to capture a share of the market. Such lists are to be distinguished
from mere identities and locations of customers where anyone could easily identify the
entities as potential customers . . . As a general principle, the more difficult information
is to obtain, and the more time and resources expended by an employer in gathering it,
the more likely a court will find such information constitutes a trade secret . .. The
requirement that a customer list must have economic value to qualify as a trade secret
has been interpreted to mean that the secrecy of this information provides a business
with a substantial business advantage ... In this respect, a customer list can be found
to have economic value because its disclosure would allow a competitor to direct its
sales efforts to those customers who have already shown a willingness to use a unique
type of service or product as opposed to a list of people who only might be interested ...
Its use enables the former employee to solicit both more selectively and more effectively.
(alterations in original) (quoting Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 735-36 (Ct. App.
1997)). This summary also illustrates the complexity involved in discerning whether business
information can even qualify for trade secret protection. It is extremely unrealistic to expect
employers, employees, or courts to have any reasonable xpectations when relying on the
extremely fact-intensive case law analyzing trade secret claims.
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loses its value. Thus, a forward-looking approach to identifying
protected information best ensures the continuing value of an
employer's proprietary information.
The FTC should further identify what constitutes "reasonable
measures to keep such information secret" so that employers can take
appropriate measures to protect their information from
misappropriation. 168 Specifying whether certain computer access
restrictions are "reasonable" would allow an employer to take the
appropriate measures before the trade secret is misappropriated. The
FTC should also specify what it means for information to "derive
independent economic value."169
Enabling the FTC to fill in these details would create
expectations upon which both employers and employees can rely. By
making the information available to employers and employees ex ante,
employees would be on notice of the acceptable uses of certain
information belonging to their employer, and thus able to avoid liability.
Likewise, employers would have guidance on how best to protect their
information to ensure they can seek legal recourse if their information
is subsequently misappropriated. To ensure the information is
adequately communicated to employees, the FTC could, for example,
require that employers provide employees with notice encompassing
information about the employer's assets that are protected by the DTSA
and the consequences of violating the DTSA as a condition of the
employer seeking protection for its information under the DTSA. 170
Congress should further provide the FTC with the authority to
issue administrative orders and litigate civil actions. When an alleged
violation of the DTSA occurs, the owner of the trade secret can file a
complaint with the FTC, and the FTC can issue upon the alleged
perpetrator an order enjoining the use or disclosure of the trade
secret.171 If the alleged perpetrator violates the order or the use of the
trade secret has already caused damage to the owner of the trade secret,
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A).
169. See id. § 1839(3)(B).
170. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3) (requiring employers to provide notice of immunity from
liability for certain exceptions to the prohibition against misappropriation to employees in an
agreement or contract governing use of trade secrets and confidential information in order for the
employer to be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees in an action against an employee to
whom notice was not provided). The FTC could require similar notice for general liability under
the DTSA in order to pursue an action against employees under the DTSA.
171. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012) (authorizing the FTC to issue complaints for violations of the
FTC Act).
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the FTC can commence a civil action in the appropriate district court,
and allow the owner of the trade secret to intervene in the action.172
Charging the FTC with creating and specifying the details of the
DTSA will encourage more consistency and clarity than the current
regime provides. Not only would this provide employers with the benefit
of specificity ex ante about what information is protected, it also has the
added benefit of a centralized system through which these actions must
proceed. When employers are considering whether to sue employees in
these circumstances, employers must calculate the risks and benefits of
pursuing litigation. The uncertainty about whether the information
taken by the employee is protected may well deter the employer from
bringing a claim against the employee at all. With a centralized system,
the employer likely has an additional indication about whether the
information qualifies for protection and can make a comparatively
informed decision before pursuing the litigation. 173 Further, business
information for which employers seek protection will likely continue to
change in the future, and agencies have more flexibility to amend rules
and guidance than courts or Congress. 174
Under this regulatory regime, the DOJ would remain charged
with prosecuting criminal offenses under the EEA. The provision
proscribing theft of trade secrets encompasses a higher mens rea
standard than the section addressing civil actions for misappropriation.
Specifically, the EEA requires showings of intent to convert a trade
secret, intent or knowledge that the offense will injure an owner of that
trade secret, and knowledge of the act that constitutes the theft of the
trade secret as compared to the DTSA, which merely requires a showing
that the alleged perpetrator had reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired through improper means.175 In prosecuting violations
172. Cf. id. § 56(a) (outlining the procedures for the FTC to exercise its authority to litigate
under the FTC Act).
173. Cf. Tradesman Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1017 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring) (discussing how variation in states' treatment of noncompetes is a powerful factor in
calculating the risks and benefits of litigation).
174. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (outlining procedures for agencies, which includes the process
of amending rules or guidance).
175. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a):
Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or service
used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will,
injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly-(1) steals, or without authorization
appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains
such information; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits,
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; ... shall ... be
fined ... or imprisoned .... ,
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under the EEA, the DOJ likely considers the intent of the actor and the
wantonness of the violation as it does in CFAA violations. However,
unlike the CFAA where there is no additional requirement of a showing
of intent for criminal liability above what is required for civil liability,
Congress has already accounted for notice concerns by protecting
individuals and organizations from excessive criminal penalties
involving inadvertent violations.17 6 Because of the differences in the
civil and criminal regimes, the DOJ should remain charged with
pursuing criminal violations under the EEA.
Providing an agency with the power to administer a federal
statute presents a potential risk of agency capture. Since employers
generally are more powerful and have a greater ability to influence
federal agencies than individual employees given their size and
resources, employers could have an influence over decisionmaking,
presenting a risk that the DTSA could become too protective of
employers in protecting their business information-at the expense of
employees and the public at large.17 7 However, this proposed regime
protects against agency capture in several ways. First, the FTC is an
independent agency, which generally creates an extra buffer against
interest group pressures that might harm the public interest or a
vulnerable group.178 Second, the courts still retain jurisdiction over
actions brought by the FTC under the DTSA, thus providing for an
independent decisionmaker.
The burden of federal regulations on employers should not be
underestimated. The complexities involved in the increasingly
prevalent administrative state can be a nightmare for employers to
navigate. However, regulating the protection of business information
through a federal agency does not entail the same concerns. Employers
would not be required to comply with the DTSA unless they intend to
rely on the statute to hold employees accountable for misappropriation
of business information. Rather, charging the FTC with administration
of the DTSA would merely provide employers with guidance to best
with id. § 1836(b)(1) (authorizing the owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated to bring a
civil action), and id. § 1839(5) ("[T]he term 'misappropriation' means-(A) acquisition of a trade
secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired
by improper means .... .").
176.The penalties for a violation of theft of a trade secret are severe. See id. § 1832(a)
(authorizing for punishment of an individual who commits the offense of theft of trade secrets fines
or imprisonment of "not more than 10 years, or both"); id. § 1832(b) (authorizing for punishment
of an organization that commits the offense of theft of trade secrets fines of "not more than the
greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret").
177. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21-24 (2010) (discussing independent agencies and the need to insulate
agencies from capture).
178. Id. at 24.
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protect their information if they intend to seek legal recourse under the
DTSA. Employers expend significant resources developing their
business information, and accordingly, they should encourage more
specificity and reliability under the DTSA to ensure their business
information is protected. Moreover, this reform would enable employees
to better understand their rights and obligations with respect to their
employers' business information. It would provide guidance and notice
to employees who might otherwise be unaware of the implications of
misusing such information.
CONCLUSION
The ease with which employees can copy, download, and transfer
proprietary information from employers' computer databases presents
a considerable threat to employers. In the ordinary course of business,
employers must authorize certain employees to access proprietary
information and rely on employees to use such information for proper
business purposes. Employers should be able to provide employees with
access to this information without fear that an employee will
misappropriate the information without legal recourse.
The current scheme of protection for employers' proprietary
information is unworkable. Despite the recently enacted federal trade
secret legislation, the application of trade secret law remains a mystery
to employers, employees, and courts. Congress should amend the CFAA
to limit the civil cause of action in the employment context and clarify
that a computer user does not "exceed[] authorized access" by using his
permission to access a computer for improper purposes. Moreover,
Congress should also amend the DTSA to grant the FTC authority to
administer the DTSA to promote reliability and consistency.
Danielle J. Reid*
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